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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
--·~----
Appellant Mary A. Schoen by this appeal seeks review of 
a decision by the Board of Review of tt1e Industrial Commission of 
Utah denying her unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4 le) r 1 4~ ·i, as amended) for failure to meet 
work search requirements for el1gib1l1ty. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On February 14, 1983, the Department of Employment 
Security issued a decision denying Appellant Mary A. Schoen 
unemployment compensation insurance benefits retroactive to 
January 2, 1983. The basis for the denial was inadequate job 
search, Appellant Schoen was also charged with an overpayment 
liability of $664.00. She requested a hearing on February 24, 
1983, and received such hearing on March 22, 1983. 
On April 4, 1983 Appeals Referee Linda Gowaty issued a 
decision modifying the Department of Employment Security's 
decision. The Referee denied benefits for the weeks ending 
January 8, January 15, and January 22 but allowed benefits for 
the week ending January 29. The Referee determined Appellant's 
overpayment liability to be $498.00 and offset the overpayment by 
benefits due her February 5, 12, and 19, 1983. 
On June 21, 1983, the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah affirmed the Referee's decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks the Court to reverse Respondent's 
decision that Appellant failed to make an active work sea;,, 
effort. Appellant further asks the Court to enter its judqmpn 
that Respondent's decision was not supported by substant,~~ 
evidence and was not in compliance with Utah law. F1nal1, 
Appellant asks that the Court find that she is entitled tJ 
unemployment compensation benefits from January 2, 1983 until she 
is no longer otherwise eligible and that therefore, as a matter 
of law, no unemployment compensation benefits received by 
Appellant after January 2, 1983 were overpayments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Schoen was hired by the Utah State Department 
of Highway Safety to set up a program in motorcycle safety. She 
is a highly skilled professional and has a Masters degree in 
industrial safety from the University of Illinois. Schoen loot 
her job when the federal government failed to renew the grant for 
the program. After losing her job, Appellant applied for and was 
awarded unemployment compensation benefits. When Schoen applied 
for benefits in December, 1982, she was instructed to make three 
new in-person job contacts per week. 
representative 
learned of 
modified this 
the appellant's 
requirement 
educational 
However the agency 
verbally when Sile 
background. 
representative encouraged Schoen to send out resumes and cm'er 
letters and make as many in-person interviews as she could secure 
by sending out resumes. (R. 71) 
Since losing her job, Appellant has been diligently rl' 
regularly seeking work. Her job search activities do not merel;• 
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include in-person contacts and sending resumes. Appellant 
utilizes her membership in various professional societies to 
obtain job leads. She reads both local and out-of-state 
newspapers to get job leads, and she makes it a practice to check 
the Job Service job board whenever she can. 
Over the JO day period covered by this appeal, 
Appellant contacted 13 prospective employers (R. 80) These 
contacts were made between Jan 6 and Jan. 31, 1983 and are 
essentially summarized in the Appeals Referee's decision. (R. 38) 
The Appeals Referee found that Appellant was eligible for 
benefits for the weeks ending January 29 and February 5, upon the 
reasoning that she would be allowed benefits for any week in 
which she made three resume searches or three in-person work 
searches. The agency representat1 ve had den Led Schoen on the 
basis of a strict three in-person contact rule. Thus the Appeals 
Referee denied benefits for the week ending January 8 even though 
she had tabulated three contacts for that week. She further 
denied benefits for the week ending January 15 even though Schoen 
had made two in-person contacts. 
Appellant Schoen explained in her testimony and 
correspondence with the Department that she relied heavily on 
resumes as this was a customary and accepted method of seeking 
work in her field. (R. 50,78) As a professional in the very 
specialized field of industrial safety and accident prevention, 
there are limited opportunities within the local job market. 
(R.72) Schoen testified that in-person contacts are often viewed 
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as rude by potential employers because employers have nc 
information on you or knowledge of your credentials and you' Lrc 
merely taking up their time. (R. 66) This is especially true 1n 
the professional fields where specialized education and training 
are prerequisites for the job. (R.67) Schoen continued: 
(R. 67) 
They don't like you dropping in on them and 
some of the parent companies that I have 
written to, have offices here in Utah, like 
Wausau, Union Pacific, the Association for 
International Student Exchange and Civil 
Service. And they, the office which is 
located in Utah, they will not even talk with 
you unless the parent office has come down 
and said something to them. 
Sometimes in-person contacts were impossible. At the 
Family Health Program (FHP) Appellant had tried to go in-person 
but was advised over the phone that they were inundated with 
applicants and she was told that there was no way that she could 
file an application and she would just have to mail in a cover 
letter and a resume. (R. 60) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Did Appellant act in good faith to make an active 
and reasonable effort to secure employment? 
2) Is the 3 in-person or resume contact rule a valid 
legal standard? 
3) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require that 
recipients of Utah unemployment compensation benefits be afforded 
a Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) hearing prior to beir>'i 
deprived of such payments? 
- 4 -
ARGUMENT 
THE BOARD 
SUPPORTED 
ARBITRARY 
LAW. 
OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
BY - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IS 
ANDCAPRJCfous AND ___ IS CONTRARY TO 
POlNT l 
APPELLANT CONDUCTED !'; L'lL1GENT JOB SEARCH. 
Utah law pro,-1cies triat: 
An unen'lc,j ovec1 n1di v idual shall be 
eligible to receive benefits with respect to 
any week orily l' -'- t has been found by the 
commission that: 
(c) He is able to work and is available for 
work during each ard every week with respect 
to which he made a -2 La lm for benefits under 
this Act, and acted in good faith in an 
active effort to secure employment .... 
Utah Code Ann. §JS-4-4 I 1953, as amended) (emphasis added). 
Utah law further c la r 1 ties the manner in which this 
requirement is to be interpreted and imposed in the next section 
of the Code, Ineligibility for benefits: 
An individual shall be 
benefits or for purposes of 
waiting period: 
ineligible for 
establishing a 
Failure to Apply for or Accept Work. 
(c) If the commission finds that the 
claimant has failed without good cause to 
properly apply for available suitable 
work ... provided no claimant shall be 
ineligible for benefits for failure to apply, 
accept a ref err al, or accept suitable work 
under circumstances of such a nature that it 
would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall consider the 
purposes of this act, the reasonableness of 
the claimant's actions, and the extent to 
which the actions evidence a genuine 
continuing attachment to the labor market in 
reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to 
equity and good conscience. 
Utah code Ann. §35-3-5(c), (1953, as amended). 
As noted above, in determining whether or not Appella~t 
has failed without good cause to properly apply for available 
suitable work, the commission must take into consideration, among 
other factors, the "purposes of this act." U.C.A. §35-4-2 states 
this public policy and purpose: 
As a guide to the interpretation and 
application of this act, the public policy of 
this state is declared to be as follows: 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a 
serious menace to the heal th, morals, and 
welfare of the people of this state. 
Unemployment is therefore a subject of 
general interest and concern which requires 
appropriate action by the legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden 
which now so often falls with crushing force 
upon the unemployed worker and his family. 
The achievement of social security requires 
protection against this greatest hazard of 
our economic life.... The legislature, 
therefore, declares that in its considered 
judgment the public good, and the general 
welfare of the citizens of this state require 
the enactment of this measure .... 
It has since been held, that this Act, being remedial 
in nature should be liberally construed. Singer Sewing Machi~ 
Co. v. Industrial Comm. 134 P.2d 479 (Utah 1943) reh.den. 1 1 ' 
P.2d 694 (Utah 1943). The Act should be administered to 
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effectuate its purposes, which include lightening the burdens of 
unemployment and maint,-iin i_ng p1nrhasu1g power in the economy. 
Johnson v. Board of Re·new --~'_!_-~~ust.rial Comm., 320 P. 2d 315 
(Utah 1958). 
The remedial purpuse uf thP Act was further stated in 
Singer Sewing Mach1~~· sup!a, to protect the health, morals, and 
welfare of the people by µrov1d1ng a cushion against the shocks 
and rigors of unemployment. The purpose of providing benefits 
was defined as twofold: First, to alleviate the need of the 
worker and his family who found nc market for their services, and 
were deprived of wages by the general business collapse; Second, 
to provide increased buying power through pump-priming, and, 
thereby, to stimulate our economic system 
Comm., 243 P.2d 964 (Utah 19521. 
Lexes v. Industrial 
It is clear from the words of the statute and the 
purpose of the Act that the law requires a subjective analysis of 
the individual claimant's acts. The statute requires that the 
claimant act in "good faith in an active effort to secure 
employment." Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4(c) (1953, as amended). 
That the law requires a subJective analysis is further 
clarified in the case law. The Utah Supreme Court held in the 
case of Denbv v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d 626 (Utah 1977) that 
the claimant "must act in good faith to make an active and 
reasonable effort to secure employment, and must be genuinely 
attached to the labor market," Id. at 628. This principle has 
not changed. The words "good faith" and "reasonable effort" 
imply a subjective individualized analysis of the claimants' job 
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search efforts. The law does not require the concrete ru 1 cc 
imposed by the Appeals Referee. (R. 39) 
Appellant utilized the best means available to het , 11 
looking for work. The Appeals Referee agreed to allow resumes to 
be considered, so long as the number of in-person and resuITe 
contacts summed to 3. Thus, she was denied benefits for a week 
in which she made two in-person contacts when the Appeals Referee 
admitted that this would normally be sufficient, except for the 
fact that eligibility worker D. Dean wrote "3 new in person" on 
Appellant's Responsibilities While Claiming Benefits form. (R. 
81). No explanation was ever offered for this more restn.ctive 
requirement being imposed upon Schoen when the general rule 
requires two in-person contacts. The Appeals Referee imposed 
this three contact limit despite the fact that at Appellant's 
eligibility review, Appellant was advised that two in-person 
contacts would be sufficient. (R. 78) 
This illustrates the absurdity of this concrete and 
inflexible minimum contact rule. The rule fails to address the 
issue of the diligence and reasonableness of the Claimant's J~ 
search activities, and is being applied inconsistently by tr.e 
Department. 
Appellant is concerned with finding the JOb most 
suitable to her skills and career goals. Appellant has made a 
good faith effort to find a job. Her work search efforts ha" 
been reasonable given her circumstances. Respondent should t 
be required to pay Appellant for those benefits illegal!;' 
withheld from her. 
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A. =C_a_s_e~~""L-'-a __ w _ F~urther ~0.£1:_~-- ___ Appellant's 
Pos1t1on. 
The case uf ~oc~_! __ J[Jdustrial Commission, 420 P.2d 44 
(Utah 1966) interprets Utah· s JOh search requiLements. The first 
two weeks of Gocke' s JOb sear•h consisted of contacting her 
former employer and inquiring about a Jab with Shoppers' Discount 
store. Towards the end of her first month of unemployment, she 
made telephone calls to four ernployers. Ten days later she 
personally applied at Albert sons, She made telephone calls to 
jewelry stores and near the end of the second month she 
personally applied at Litton Data Svstems. Then during the last 
week of the second month she ma1 led replies to newspaper box 
advertisements. On these facts the Utah Supreme Court found 
that: 
There ls no th i rrg Hr the Referee's findings 
which will support any inference that she did 
not make a legitimate attempt to obtain work. 
Based upon her apparent clean work record, it 
seems reasonable and natural that she should 
look to her former employer in the first 
instance for re-employment. When that 
expectation did not materialize, the 
plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking 
employment elsewhere by personal application, 
telephone calls and written responses to 
newspaper advertisements. These affirmative 
acts are all in the record and the Referee's 
own findings of fact. Such efforts 
constitute a reasonable effort on her part to 
obtain work. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in Gocke 
that: 
The Employment Security Act should be 
liberally construed to best effectuate its 
purposes which include enabling unemployed 
workers to find suitable work and to provide 
cash benefits during periods of unemployment. 
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_!£. at 46. Certainly the Department has failed to effectuat~ the 
Act's purpose in Appellant's case. 
Id. at 47. 
The Gocke decision went on to state: 
Only if it is understood that an 
unemployment compensation law is a broad 
public measure, designed by the payment of 
benefits to check and ameliorate the effects 
of unemployment among workers who are able, 
willing and ready to work, will workers be 
assured the reasonable protection which the 
statute has provided for them. The same view 
was expressed by Justice Cardozo when he 
stated: 
"An unemployment law framed in such a 
way that the unemployed who look to it 
will be deprived of reasonable 
protection is one in name and nothing 
more." See Stewart Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, at 593, 57 S.Ct. 
~891, 81 L.Ed. 1279 ( 1937). 
B. The Courts Frown Upon Rigid and Inflexible 
Standards in Job Search Cases. 
The words of the Utah statute do not set a rigid and 
inflexible standard which can be applied in determining 
eligibility. Rather, it creates a standard of reasonabi li ty in 
the conduct of the claimant in seeking employment, which must be 
determined as an issue of fact by the Department in eac 11 
particular case in accordance with all of the evidence, facts and 
circumstances bearing upon the situation. See, Brown v. Board ~f 
Review, 289 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. 1972). 
In the case of Employment Security Administratior. 
Board of Appeals v. Smith, 383 A.2d 1108 (Ct. of App. Md. lJ 
the court found that telephone contacts were reasonable in 11ur 
of the lack of public transportation in the area. Smith ha•J 
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contracted 35 businesses over a 7 month period, mostly by 
telephone, The Maryland court found that in light of all the 
circumstances, claimant Smith had made active and reasonable 
efforts to secure employment. 
In Cascade Roll"n';l_M1lls, Inc. v. Employment Div., 554 
P.2d 549 (Or. App. ·1'J76J tr1e court r1eld that, where for a period 
of less than six weeks after his former employer failed to offer 
claimant work after being ir,_iured on the job, the employee 
telephoned one other employer and registered for work with local 
union leaders he had been "actively seeking work." 
In the case of Bloomf1elc v. Employment Div., 550 P.2d 
1400 (Or. App, 1976) the court held that 1 personal contact and 
"numerous telephone calls and other contacts" were sufficient. 
In Hill v. District_ [:nemp_loy_ment_:::o~ensation Board, 
302 A.2d 226 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1':1/JJ the court in similar facts 
found that neither the unemployment compensation statute nor the 
Board's regulations required a claimant to make, as a condition 
precedent, at least three JOb contacts weekly. The court relied 
upon claimant's testimony and the testimony of her witnesses that 
she had made numerous iob contacts, and a constant effort to 
obtain employment. The court n"Jted that the Board's findings 
were based largely upon st.atements set forth on standard forms 
indicating 12 personal ]Ob contacts in 12 weeks. The court 
observed that "many of the standard forms, prepared as they were 
by an IllLnois claims taker, contained illegible cryptic notes." 
Id. at 227, 228. 
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Case law, both in Utah and across the country suppc n, 
Appellant's claim and establishes that her job search'""' 
reasonable within the meaning of the law. 
POINT II 
THE THREE CONTACTS RULE IS VOID 
The three contacts rule as referred to above is vo1a •S 
it is contrary to Utah law and has never been promulgated as a 
rule pursuant to Utah law. The Utah law cited previously cleart1 
requires a subjective analysis of each claimants efforts in light 
of their personal circumstances. 
not allow for such an analysis 
contacts rule discounts telephone 
and their own "Claimant Guide" 
The minimum contacts rule does 
to take place. The min1mwn 
contacts in violation of law 
which encourages the use of 
telephone calls, resumes and other non-personal contacts. Utah 
Department of Employment Security, Unemployment Insurance 
Claimant Guide, at 7 (February 1982). The minimum contacts rule 
has been criticized by the courts as being overly rigid and 
inflexible, and not in compliance with the Unemployment 
Compensation Act. 
The Utah Administrative Rule-making Act, Utah Code An.1 
§63-46-1 et ~·, which is applicable to every agency of t~.e 
State of Utah sets out the requirements that the state agenc 
must follow prior to adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule. 
These requirements mandate the agency to give prior notice 
intended action, provide for public comment, and perhaps pro 
a public hearing. The rule must then be filed with the state 
archivist. The rule must then be published in the Utah Bulletin 
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and ultimately codified in the Department's Rules of 
Ad]udication. The minimum contacts rule had clearly never been 
properly promulgated as a rule in Utah and was thus void at the 
time Respondent applied it against Appellant- It is a well 
understood principle of law that a rule is invalid if the agency 
failed to comply with the requisite rulemaking requirements, 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 1'19 (J974), 
Appellant is aware that on January 20, 1983, Respondent 
began the process of promulgating the minimum contacts rule 
through emergency rulemaking procedures. The new rule took 
effect April 5, 1983. The l"'ew rule redefines "good faith work 
search effort" to include, but not be limited to, in-person 
contacts with employers. The rule creates a rebut table 
presumption that a claimant has net 'nade an active work search 
effort if the claimant fails to make a specific minimum number of 
in-person employer contacts after being told to do so by a local 
Employment Security office. Utah Admin. Bull. No. 83-7 at 77 
(April 1, 1983). A copy of which is attached to this brief as 
Exhibit 1. However, even though the state has now promulgated 
such a rule, it was not in effect at the time Schoen's case was 
adJudicated. Furthermore, this rule violates the Utah 
unemployment compensation statutes and as such is ultra vires and 
is thus invalid. 
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POINT III 
THE DEPARTMENT'S PRACTICE OF TERMINATING 
APPELLANT'S BENEFITS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND 
A HEARING DENIED HER DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In 1970 the United States Supreme Court declared thaL a 
welfare recipient's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights wouJd 
be violated if that recipient were terminated from welfa1e 
benefits without notice and a pre-termination fair hearing. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg v. Kell:i:, 
the court found that: "Relevant constitutional restraints apply 
as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to 
disqualification for unemployment compensation." Id. at 262 
(emphasis added). 
The New York procedure challenged in Goldberg v. Kelly 
provided that a caseworker who had doubts about a recipient's 
continued eligibility for benefits would first discuss these 
doubts with the recipient. If the caseworker concluded that the 
recipient was no longer eligible he/she would recommend 
termination of aid to a unit supervisor. If the latter 
concurred, he/she would send the recipient a letter stating t~ 
reasons for proposing to terminate aid. The letter also informed 
the recipient that within seven days he or she could request that 
a higher official review the record and that she could submit a 
written statement in support of her claim. If the review1:·,,; 
official affirmed the determination of ineligibility, aid wnu l -
be terminated immediately. After termination, the recipient wcts 
entitled to a "fair hearing" and after that to judicial review. 
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The challenge to this procedure was that 1t did not allow for the 
personal appearance of the recipient before a re~iewinq official, 
for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and 
cross-examination of adverse w1 tnesses prior to terminat.i.on of 
benefits. 
Respondent's procedures for terminating unemployment 
compensation benefits 1n Utah are much mor·e inadequate than those 
procedures that Goldberg v. Kelly struck down. Like the New York 
procedure, Utah provides for an initial confrontation between a 
claimant and an agency representative. However, in Utah no 
notice of the reasons for termination is ever given prior to 
termination. Furthermore, the Utah claimant is never allowed to 
even make a written obJect1on prior to termination as the 
recipient in Goldberg v. Kell1 was. Thus, there is even less due 
process allowed in Utah and more reason to strike down the 
procedure than there was in Goldberg v. Kelly. 
A year after the Goldberg v. Kelly decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to California's termination 
procedure for unemployment compensation benefits. California 
Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 
(1971). California Unemployment Compensation recipients had 
initially brought the action to enjoin California from 
terminating their benefits without a pre-termination hearing. 
Java v. California Department of Human Resources, 317 F.Supp. 87~ 
(N.D. Cal. 1970). They argued that there was a median delay of 
seven weeks before payments were resumed and that this violated 
the claimant's federal statutory and constitutional rights. The 
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United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that this delay violated 42 U.S.C. §503(a) wh1:h 
requires that payments be made "when due." Relying on Goldber_:r 
v. Kelly, supra, the District Court also held that denial of a 
pre-termination hearing violated the claimants' right to due 
process of law. In reaching its conclusions, the court balanced 
the claimants' interest in having the necessities of life while 
the bureaucracy mulls over his or her continued eligibility 
against the state's interest in protecting public funds. 
On review by the Supreme Court it was found that 
termination of unemployment compensation benefits without a 
pre-termination hearing violated 42 U.S.C. §503 because benefits 
would not be paid "when due." The court reasoned that Congress 
had intended for unemployment benefits to provide cash at a time 
when a claimant has nothing else to spend, thus maintaining the 
claimant at subsistence levels without the necessity of turning 
to welfare or private charity. In addition, Congress intended 
unemployment insurance payments to act as a means of exerting an 
influence upon the stability of industry. California Department 
of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). 
The United States District Court for Vermont reached 
the same conclusions in Wheeler v. State of Vermont, 335 F.Supp. 
856 (D. Vermont 1972). In Wheeler the claimant was called in for 
a "periodic interview" during which she was given a form on wh]cn 
to list the names of firms contacted. The form also con taine•i 
this language: 
You are to contact three places of 
employment as a routine factory worker 
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or general off ice 
2/17/71 and 2/24/71. 
clerk between 
These are to be 
personal contacts in the Rutland area. 
Id. at 858. A week later the claimant was called in for another 
interview where she signed a statement filled out and read to her 
by the interviewer. The statement read in pertinent part: 
I did not actively seek work as 
directed by making personal contacts 
during the week of 2/l'/71 and 2/24/71 
because I answered 2 ads in the 
Rutland Herald. I talked to an 
individual in personnel in one ad and 
was informed I had the qualifications 
for the job and I would be notified if 
I got the job. I felt fairly sure 
after the phone conversation that I 
had the job and therefore, made no 
other contacts. 
Id. at 858-859. 
The day after signing tr1i s statement the claimant was 
terminated from benefits. The next week the claimant signed a 
second statement which read: 
I did not actively seek work as 
directed by the local offices because 
I did not have transportation during 
the week ending 2/27/71. 
Id. at 859. That same day a second determination adverse to the 
claimant was made. 
After an adverse "fair hearing" determination, the 
claimant brought suit alleging that due process had been denied 
her because (1) the fact-finding interviews were not conducted by 
the same person making the decision to terminate her benefits, 
(2) there was no prior notice that the fact-finding process was 
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to take place, ( 3) there was no opportunity to know be foreh,ir,d 
the specific reasons for the terminations of her benefits, anct 111 
the claimant did not have an opportunity to consult with coun'f l 
or to confront or cross-examine witnesses before the decision 1 ri 
terminate her benefits was made. 
The court held that because the average time between 
termination of a Vermont claimant's benefits and her fair hearing 
was 37.5 days, the Vermont procedure violated 42 U.S.C 
§503(a) (1) in that benefits were not paid "when due." The court 
also held unemployment compensation benefits could not be treated 
differently from the welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970); the wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 
395 U.S. 337 (1969); the right to a tax exemption in Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); or the right to public employment 
in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (19561. 
The Utah procedure applied against Appellant Schoen was 
even more violative of her rights than the Vermont procedure in 
Wheeler. Appellant was only interviewed on one occasion prior to 
the termination of her benefits. She was given no warning 
whatsoever prior to that interview as to what to expect. She was 
not allowed to have an attorney present at the interview. Nor 
was she advised beforehand what issues would be raised at the 
interview or that the interview might result in the terminat1cn 
of her benefits. Like the claimant in Wheeler, Appellant 'o 
benefits were terminated after the interview, based 
information received during the interview. However, Appellant's 
benefits were terminated retroactively a full month prior to the 
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interview thus creating a large overpayment. Furthermore, 
Appellant was made to wait 39 days from the time she applied for 
a fair hearing and the time she received 
The average wait in Vermont had been 
the hearing decision. 
37.5 days. In fact, 
Appellant's waiting period was neariy as long as the one which 
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 1.n California Department of 
Human Resources Develoement v. Ja;:~, 402 U.S. 121 (1971), 
discussed above. There is thtis compelling authority to hold 
Utah's procedure invalid. 
Mary Schoen' s claim was terminated eleven days after 
she had been called in for an eligibility review. At that time, 
she had presented her Eligibility Review form listing her job 
contacts. At her hearing, Appellant testified that she disagreed 
that her job search was inadequate, and explained why. This 
scenario illustrates the precise reasons why the U.S. District 
Court for the district of Connecticut struck down an identical 
practice in that state. 
(D.Conn. 1973). 
See Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F.Supp. 922 
In Connecticut, a recipient was required to make 
bi-weekly visits to the Unemployment Compensation Department to 
fill out a "Continued Claim for Unemployment Compensation" form 
upon which he would swear to his availability for work and his 
"reasonable efforts" to find work. He also would fill out a 
"Continued 
were then 
Claim Work EffoI t Information Form." These papers 
if no presented to an employee of the Department; 
questions were raised, he was paid. If the Department employee 
raised an issue of possible disqualification, the claimant was 
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sent in for a "seated interview." He was then interviewed by a 
"Fact Finding Examiner," who sought to ascertain facts as tc, 
possible disqualification. If the examiner decided that tfie 
claimant had not conducted a diligent job search, the claimant 
was not given his check and was told that he would receive 
written notification. A letter was then sent out under the 
signature of the off ice manager 
termination. 
stating the reasons for 
The Steinberg court held that the "seated interview" 
system did not provide sufficient procedural due process. 
Claimants were provided no advance notice of the interview, or of 
the precise issues involved, and consequently had no opportunity 
to either prepare their arguments or present witnesses on their 
behalf. Nor were claimants provided with an opportunity to 
confront adverse witnesses. 
consult with counsel either. 
No opportunity was provided to 
Finding due process lacking, the 
Connecticut court enjoined the Department from continuing thio; 
practice. 
This case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) who remanded the case in 
light of the fact that the Connecticut Legislature had enact~ 
major revisions in the law, some of which were designed tc 
alleviate problems that the lower court had identified. 
The comparison between Utah's practices d,, 
Connecticut's is quite obvious. Schoen's benefits were 
terminated without prior notice or a Goldberg v. Kelly hearing 
She was never provided an adequate opportunity to present her 
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arguments nor present the additional information that she had. 
She was merely summarily terminated from benefits< 
This termination has c·aused Appellant tremendous 
financial hardship as this was her only source of income at the 
time and she had many financial obligations< 
Respondent's procedure thus violated Schoen's due 
process rights to notice and a fal! hearing as well as 42 U.S.C. 
§503(a) (1) which requires that unemployment compensation benefits 
be provided "when due<" Respondent should be enjoined from 
further application of these proceduLes and required to provide a 
fair hearing prior to termination of a claimants benefits. 
POINT IV. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The role of the Utah Supreme Court under Section 
35-4-lO(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act is to: 
[S)ustain the determination of the 
Board of Review, unless the record 
clearly and persuasively proves the 
action of the Board was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable. 
Specifically, as a matter of law, the 
determination was wrong; because only 
the opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from the facts. 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 568 P.2d 7 ~) -r " .. 729-30 (Utah 1977). 
As stated above, Respondent has deprived Appellant of 
her sole means of support through a rigid and inflexible job 
search requirement. Appellant made 13 employer contacts over a 
25 day period, an amount far exceeding the reasonable job search 
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efforts being upheld in most cases. Yet she has been denied 
benefits by Respondent because she did not make precisely J ~ew 
in-person or resume employer contacts each week. As shown abcve, 
Respondent's requirement is void because it violates Utah 
Employment Security statutes and because it has not been 
promulgated as a rule under Utah's Administrative Rule-making Act 
at the time it was applied against Appellant. Appellant was 
subjected to a standard more rigid than that imposed on other 
Claimants. Thus, Respondent's deprivation of Appellant's 
benefits for failure to meet an invalid requirement was 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
Respondent also violated Appellant's due process rights 
to notice and a pre-termination hearing. In addition, Respondent 
violated 42 U.S.C. §503(a) (1) by failing to insure that benefits 
were provided when due. 
capricious and unreasonable. 
These acts were also arbitrary, 
Finally, Respondent has caused hardships to Appellant 
which far exceed any wrong which Respondent could ever 
conceivably find in Appellant's actions. All of these hardships 
have resulted because of Respondent's arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable application of an inflexible and invalid standard. 
This Court should strike down and enjoin Respondent's illegal 
practices, reverse Respondent's findings, and award full benefits 
to the Appellant, Mary Schoen. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Schoen has presented copious evidence as 
proof of her diligent job search efforts that demonstrate her 
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continuing attachment to the labor market. Appellant's actions 
fully comply with the requirements of Utah law. Utah law did not 
require a minimum number of contacts each week. This unwritten 
rule was void as it had not been legally promulgated. 
Furthermore, It remains void even after promulgation because it 
is in conflict with Utah statutory law as interpreted by case 
law. 
Finally, Appellant was terminated from benefits in 
violation of law as she was not provided prior notice and a due 
process hearing, and because this practice of the Respondent was 
not reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment 
compensation benefits when due. 
Appellant therefore requests that she be reimbursed for 
all benefits denied her and that the Department be enjoined from 
terminating her claim again for any reason other than exhaustion 
of benefits without first providing her with due process of law. 
II 
DATED this )(~J_ day of September, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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fil,IPLOYMENT SECURITY 
17 4 Social nail Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1WOP IED .t.COLES 
ARM File No. 6106, Adopted Amendment 
Title: General Rules of Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Able and Available, 
Section 160 · Effort of Secure Employ· 
ment, Actively Seeking Work. 
Redefines "good faith effort" to find 
work as including, but not limited to, in· 
person contacts with employers. 
Also, creates a rebuttable presumption 
of failure to make an active work search 
when a claimant fails to make a specific 
minimum number of in-person employer 
contacts after being instructed by bis local 
office to do so. 
EC!ective date: April 5, 1982. 
ARM File No, 6107, Adopted Amendment 
Title: General Rules oC Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Able and Available, 
Section 190 · Evidence, Burden oC Proof. 
Requires a claimant to keep a record 
of bis work search efforts; permits retro-
active disqualification and assessment of a 
fault overpayment for failure to establish 
to the satisfaction of the Department that 
the claimant made an active work search; 
retroactive disqualification is limited to 
four (4) weeks. 
EC!ectiYe date: April 5, 1983. 
ARM File No. 6108, Adopted Amendment 
Title: General Rules of Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Volunatary Leaving, 
Section 155.2 • Movement to Another Lo· 
cality. 
Removes provision allowing good 
cause Cor quit to accompany a spouse, to 
bring Rule into conformity with 1982 a· 
mentment oC Section 35-4..S(a), which 
states that a quit to accompany, follow or 
join a spouse is without good cause. 
Effective date: April 5, 1983. 
EXHIBIT 
j_ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPFLLANT was rna1 led first-class postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Floyd G. Astin 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
P. O. Box 11249 
Salt Lake CJty, Utah 84147 
K. Allan Zabel 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
P. o. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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DATED this day ot September, l 98 3. 
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